In game-theoretic equilibrium, players' beliefs about choices by others are statistically correct. This "mutual consistency" assumption often predicts poorly in one-shot games. We develop an alternative "cognitive hierarchy" (CH) theory. In the CH model players who are not thinking strategically (0 steps) randomize. Players doing k steps of thinking predict accurately what lower-level players (steps 0 to k − 1) do, and best-respond given their beliefs. The model can explain why equilibration is so limited in some games (such as p-beauty contest), and surprisingly accurate in other games (such as business entry). The average number of thinking steps is about 1.5 across many games.
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Introduction
Most theories of behavior in games assume that players think strategically (that is, they form beliefs by analyzing what others might do) and choose optimal responses given their beliefs. Precision often comes from the further assumption that each player's belief is consistent with what the other players actually plan to choose-i.e., players are in equilibrium.
The modern view in game theory is that equilibrium arises from adaptation, evolution, communication, or imitation. Since these processes take time, equilibration should not occur instantly in one-shot games. Indeed, mutual consistency is routinely violated in one-shot game experiments. In Bertrand pricing games, for example, players always have an incentive to undercut, so price should immediately go to marginal cost. But players do not immediately price at marginal cost (though they learn to over time; e.g., . Another example (discussed more below) is the "p-beauty contest" game. In this game players pick numbers from 0 to 100 and the player whose number is closest to p times the average wins a fixed prize. The equilibrium is zero, but average choices in one-shot games with p = 2/3 are typically from 20 to 35, reflecting lack of mutual consistency.
The goals of a nonequilibrium theory are to weaken mutual consistency, while retaining the precision and generality which makes equilibrium theories so useful, and explaining data more accurately. This paper explores one such approach, which we call "cognitive hierarchy" (CH). The CH model has two components-(1) decision rules for players doing k steps of thinking, and (2) a frequency distribution of steps f (k).
The decision rules reflect an iterated process of strategic thinking: a player who does k steps of thinking figures out what players who are doing less thinking are likely to do, and best-responds given those beliefs. The iterative process begins with "level 0" types who choose according to some probability distribution (for simplicity, we assume uniform). The distribution f (k) is assumed to be Poisson, which has only one parameter τ , its mean and variance. Poisson is simple and has some useful theoretical properties.
The values of τ which fit actual choices best are estimated in many different games. Generally, values of τ between 1 to 2 fit reasonably well, and are usually better than equilibrium predictions. These estimates are robust because fixing a common τ across games fits almost as well as estimating τ separately for each game. In 24 p-beauty contest data sets, the median estimateτ = 1.61. The conclusion that people appear to do only one or two steps of thinking, on average, explains why the convergence process in those games stops at an average around 30, rather than converging to the equilibrium of zero.
In other games players are surprisingly close to equilibrium in one-shot games. In business entry games, for example, a market has a known capacity c and players decide simultaneously whether to enter or not. In one-shot experiments, the frequency of entry is close to the capacity c, as equilibrium theories predict. In other games with mixedstrategy equilibria, frequencies are often surprisingly close to the mixture rates predicted by equilibrium. The Poisson CH model fits these data fairly well (with medianτ = 1.78). The key is that the strategic structure of games with mixed equilibria means that low-k and high-k players tend to pick different strategies. So the population of players using different numbers of reasoning steps will collectively mix across different strategies. Therefore, the Poisson CH model is able to explain limited equilibration in games like beauty contests, and the surprising degree of "instant equilibration" that occurs in entry and mixed-equilibrium games, with similar values of τ .
Businesses which buy advice and forecasts presumably think they can earn more money using the forecasts than they could earn without them. A similar measure of marginal "economic value" can be used to judge whether theories like Nash equilibrium and CH help experimental subjects earn more money. Across many games, the CH model adds value reliably, while equilibrium theories sometimes add value and sometimes subtract value.
The point of this paper is that a simple model of limited thinking can be useful both theoretically and empirically; making this point requires covering a lot of ground. The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the CH model, and some precursors and alternative specifications. Section III collects some theoretical results. Section IV reports estimation of the τ parameter from six classes of games. Section V explores economic value. Section VI notes how the CH model can account for two patterns of broad economic interest-speculation and money illusion. Section VII concludes and sketches future research. Many details which are only briefly alluded to below are in our longer paper (Camerer, Ho and Chong, 2002 ). We will index a player's position in the cognitive hierarchy (the number of steps of thinking she does) by k. A k-step player's expected payoff (given her beliefs) for choosing s j i is E k (π i (s j i )). The probability of a k-step thinker choosing strategy s j i is P k (s j i ). The frequency of k-step players is f (k). Our goal is to specify decision rules for players and f (k).
Decision rules for different thinking steps
The iterative process starts with 0-step players. They choose according to a probability distribution which is not derived from strategic thinking. A convenient special case used throughout this paper, is uniform randomization 2 across strategies-that is, P 0 (s
∀j. Uniform randomization is a placeholder assumption which could be relaxed in later research.
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Denote a k-step player's belief about the proportion of h-step players by g k (h). We assume that players doing k ≥ 1 steps do not realize others are using more than k steps 2 Equal randomization means all strategies are chosen with strictly positive probability. This is helpful for maximum-likelihood estimation because all strategies have predicted likelihoods which are positive, which allows us to assume higher-step types are best-responding without creating a zero-likelihood problem. Having all strategies chosen with positive probability also solves two familiar problems-eliminating noncredible threats (since all threats are "tested") as subgame perfection does; and eliminating ad hoc rules for Bayesian updating after zero probability events (since there are no such events). 3 The choices of zero-step thinkers may be particularly sensitive to experimental suggestion or advice (Cabrera, Capra, and Gomez, 2002) , treatments such as belief-elicitation which influence thinking (see our working paper), and focal points. For example, in Schelling-type matching games in which players choose an object from a set (flowers, mountains, numbers · · ·) and earn a fixed prize if they match, it is plausible that 0-step thinkers pick whatever springs to mind. Since higher-step players want to match, the modal 0-step choice then becomes focal. This idea is illustrated by Mehta, Starmer and Sugden's (1994) experiments. When picking a favorite name, 9.1% of their subjects picked John, 6.8% picked Fred, and 5.7% picked Dave. But when picking a name to match somebody else, 50% picked John. Similarly, when choosing a favorite gender 53% picked "Him"; but when matching, 84% chose "Him".
of thinking (g
. This is plausible because the brain does not always understand its own limits, or how to think beyond them. We also assume that people are overconfident and do not realize there are others using as many thinking steps as they are (i.e., g k (k) = 0). This is consistent with psychological evidence about persistent overconfidence about relative skill in many domains (e.g., Camerer and Lovallo, 1999).
We assume that k-step players have an accurate guess about the relative proportion of players who are thinking less than they are. They normalize these actual frequencies to form their beliefs about the competition-
, ∀ h < k. This specification exhibits "increasingly rational expectations": As k increases, the deviation between the actual frequencies f (h) and the beliefs g k (h) shrinks. 4 This property implies that in the limit as k grows large, players doing k and k +1 steps of thinking will have approximately the same beliefs and make the same choices, and have the same expected payoffs. This fact means that for a large k, there is no marginal benefit for a k-step player to think harder. This property could prove useful for establishing limited thinking through some kind of cost-benefit analysis (a la Gabaix and Laibson, 2000; Gabaix et al., 2003) .
Given these beliefs, the expected payoff to a k−step thinker from strategy s
, and randomize equally if two or more strategies have identical expected payoffs). Given a distribution f (k), the model can be completely solved recursively, starting with 0-step player behavior and iterating to compute P 1 (s
It is easy to imagine alternative specifications. One is that k-step players think all others do only k − 1-steps of thinking (i.e., g k (k − 1) = 1; see Nagel, 1995; Stahl and Wilson, 1995; Ho, Camerer and Weigelt, 1998 ; and Costa-Gomes, Crawford and Broseta, 2001 ). This alternative fits about as well as our specification but exhibits increasingly ir rational expectations-i.e., g k (h) gets further from f (h) as k grows, rather than closerand makes implausible predictions in some games.
5 Assuming players respond stochasti- 4 Use the sum of the absolute deviations to measure the distance of the normalized distributions from the true distribution. The total absolute deviation for k ≥ 1 is:
is decreasing in kso beliefs get closer and closer to the truth-and lim k→∞ D(k) = 0 because P ∞ h=0 f (h) = 1. Note that as k grows, the denominator in the normalized beliefs g k (h) definition, P k−1 l=0 f (l), converges to one, which means that beliefs g k (h) and g k+1 (h) will be close together for k large relative to τ . 5 In the entry game described below, the g k (k − 1) = 1 specification leads to cycles in which e(i, c)
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cally instead of best-responding is certainly a plausible alternative but generally improves fit only a little in the games we have studied.
Another possibility is to assume that k-step players realize there are other k−step thinkers. Self-awareness of this sort is plausible 6 but adds computational difficulty (because fixed points must be computed at each step of thinking). It also makes the model very similar to an equilibrium one because it imposes mutual consistency among players within each step (while relaxing mutual consistency across steps). Since our goal is to explain both where equilibrium predicts well and where it fails, adding an element of partial equilibration is not necessarily helpful (and indeed, it fits worse in the five data sets reported in our working paper).
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is relatively easy to prove theorems about its properties (see section 3 below), compared to more general specifications.
It is helpful to think about some properties a reasonable parametric distribution f (k) might have. Since the thinking steps are integers, a discrete distribution is natural (see also Stahl, 1998 ). The decision rules described above also require more and more steps of computation as k rises, because a k−step thinker does all the computations the lowerstep thinkers do, then combines the results to calculate her own expected payoffs. If this process is constrained by working memory, it is plausible that as k rises, fewer and fewer players do the next step of thinking beyond k.
8 For example, in Keynes's (1936) famous passage on the stock market as a beauty contest, he says "there are some, I believe, who practise the fourth, fifth and higher degrees [of reasoning about reasoning]" (p156). Keynes's timid wording-"some"-suggests he thinks that few investors do that much thinking (in CH terms, f (k) is small for k ≥ 4).
A reduced-form way to express the result of increasing complexity combined with working memory constraint is
Among discrete distributions, this property holds if and only if the distribution f (k) is Poisson, f (k) = e −τ τ k /k!. The Poisson distribution is fully characterized by one parameter, which we call τ (for thinking steps), which is both its mean and its variance.
Because the Poisson model has only one degree of freedom, specifying particular values or bounds on any one f (k) leads directly to a precise distribution across all f (k). For example, if f (1) is the mode-i.e., 1-step thinking is the most common-then τ ∈ (1, 2). If f (1) is maximized compared to the neighboring frequencies f (0) and f (2), or if 0-and 2-step thinking are equally common,
≈ 1.618, a remarkable constant known as the "golden ratio" which occurs eerily often in nature and science. 9 While none of these assumptions are more compelling than the others, they show the simplicity of the Poisson distribution, where committing to a particular value of f (k) (or property) pins the model down completely.
8 Important evidence that working memory plays a role in strategic thinking comes from Devetag and Warglien (2003) . They measure the amount of working memory using a classic "digit span" task (i.e., how many digits a person can remember from a long string). They find that measured working memory is modestly correlated with the tendency to eliminate iteratedly-dominated strategies. Other evidence of limited thinking is reported by Hedden and Zhang (2002) 9 The golden ratio is the limit of the ratios of adjacent numbers in the Fibbonaci sequence. It is often used in architecture because rectangles with golden ratio proportions are aesthetically pleasing. It also occurs in spiral patterns of seashells and hawks flying in spirals toward their prey. 
Other models of limited thinking
The CH approach is related to many early and recent ideas in game theory. Fictitious play models (Brown, 1951; Robinson 1951) were originally proposed as a model of a player's internal mental tatônnement, as a way to (potentially) derive Nash equilibrium (then later adapted as theories of learning by Fudenberg and Kreps, 1990 ). In our terms, fictitious play is simply a CH model in which k = 1 types begin with a diffuse prior belief, f (k) = 1/N for N steps of thinking, and N → ∞. The general idea of a recursive step-by-step model was also endorsed, much later, by Selten (1998, p. 421) , who wrote that the natural way of looking at game situations...is not based on circular concepts, but rather on a step-by-step reasoning procedure.
Our model is similar in spirit to the concept of "rationalizability" in game theory (Bernheim, 1984; Pearce, 1984) , which weakens mutual consistency but requires strategies to be rational given some beliefs (and iterates that requirement). The CH model achieves more precision than rationalizability, in many games, by adding structure in the form of specific decision rules and f (k) frequencies.
The idea of 1-step reasoning has been used in many domains (traceable at least to Laplace). Banks, Camerer and Porter (1994) focused on the 1-step rule to explain departures from equilibrium in signaling games. Haruvy and Stahl (1998) found that the 1-step rule is better predictor of one-shot game behavior than minimax, maximax and (Nash) equilibrium.
Apparent limits on strategic thinking also emerged from experimental studies of alternating-offer bargaining. In these experiments, players usually make offers closer to equal splits than the predicted offers derived from subgame perfection (and self-interest). Direct measurement of attention to future nodes in these games shows that part of reason for near-equal offers is limited thinking ahead (see Johnson Iterating thinking steps beyond one level was first suggested by Binmore (1988) and applied to data by Nagel (1995) and Stahl and Wilson (1995) . Other thinking types (e.g., equilibrium and altruistic players) were considered by Stahl and Wilson (1995) and Costa-Gomes, Crawford and Broseta (2001).
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The CH model relaxes mutual consistency but assumes players choose best responses. Quantal response equilibrium (QRE) does the opposite, retaining mutual consistency but assuming a stochastic or "softmax" response function (Rosenthal, 1989; Chen, Friedman and Thisse, 1996; Palfrey, 1995, 1998; Goeree and Holt, 1999 ).
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Weizsacker (2003) introduces asymmetries to QRE, so that players can think others are responding more noisily than those players actually are. (One-step thinking is a special case in which players respond with no noise but think others are purely random.) Kübler and Weizsacker (in press ) extend this idea to cascade experiments. Goeree and Holt (2002) propose a two-parameter model of 'noisy introspection' in which choices are stochastic best responses to iterations of thinking which are increasingly noisy. Earlier, Capra (1999) introduced a "thinking tree" model in which players imagine all possible cycles consisting of a move, an opponent's best response, and their "initial" move as a best response to the opponent's best response. Because responses are actually stochastic, all possible cycles occur. Summing over their different likelihoods gives predicted frequencies for each strategy. Capra's model uses a single parameter which simultaneously affects both the degree of noise in responses and the degree of mutual consistency, instead of separating them as Goeree and Holt's two-parameter model does.
Our approach contributes to the literature described above by adding precision to iterated-thinking models which have previously estimated separate values of f (k) for various k (and introduced other decision rules). We also strive to see whether the same iterated-thinking model (and similar values of τ ) can explain why there is limited equilibration in some games and approximate equilibration in others.
At this early stage of research, it is sensible to explore and compare many different specifications.
11 Besides empirical accuracy and parameter stability across games, computability could be a factor in choosing models. QRE and asymmetric QRE require solving for fixed points, which can be slow. Those models, along with noisy introspection and thinking trees, can also be slow to compute in games with many strategies. Computing the CH prediction is not very sensitive to the number of strategies, but can be 10 Our long working paper compares QRE to CH more thoroughly. It generally fits a little worse than CH on one-shot games, although the two models usually predict deviations from Nash equilibrium in the same direction and similar magnitude. 11 Our working paper compares QRE and some alternative CH specifications and also proposes some new experiments to distinguish CH and QRE.
slow in n-player games (because of the multinomial distribution of step types when there is more than one other player).
Some theoretical properties of the Poisson CH model
The combination of optimizing decision rules and the one-parameter Poisson structure makes the CH model relatively easy to work with theoretically. This section illustrates some of its properties.
Dominance-solvable games
When f (k) is Poisson-distributed, the relative proportions of types one step below and two steps below a k-step thinker,
, puts overwhelming weight on the k − 1 types if τ is very large (i.e., k ¿ τ ). In that case, a k-step thinker acts as if almost all others are using k − 1 steps. This property of the Poisson distribution provides a simple way to link thinking steps to iterated deletion of dominated strategies. First note that 1-step thinkers will never choose weakly-dominated strategies, because those strategies are never best responses to the randomization of 0-step types. 12 Now assume τ is very large. Then 2-step thinkers act as if they are playing a mixture of (almost) all 1-step thinkers who have deleted weakly-dominated strategies, and a small percentage of 0-step thinkers who are random. These 2-step thinkers will not play strategies which are strictly-dominated or strategies which are weakly-dominated after deleting weaklydominated strategy play by others. This logic can be iterated indefinitely.
Another important property of the CH model is that if a k-step thinker plays a (pure) equilibrium strategy, then all higher-step thinkers will play that strategy too. 13 12 This property holds even if 0-step thinkers do not randomize uniformly, as long as all their strategy choices have strictly positive probability. 13 Simple proof: The k-step thinker plays the equilibrium strategy, call it s e , against a perceived mixture of types 0 to k − 1. The k + 1-step thinker faces a perceived mixture of types 0 to k − 1 (with relative weight
. But by definition s e is a best-response to the mixture of types 0 to k − 1, and a best response to k's play of s e (since it is a pure equilibrium strategy). By linearity of the expected payoffs, s e is therefore a best-response to the mixture of types from 0 to k − 1 and type k.
This means that once a type k reaches a pure equilibrium strategy all higher types will play it too.
The logic of working up the cognitive hierarchy, and realizing that if an equilibrium is reached by type k's then all higher types play it too, together imply that as τ → ∞ the prediction of the CH model will converge to any Nash equilibrium which is reached by finitely-many iterated deletions of weakly-dominated strategies. (It is not generally true, however, that CH converges to Nash as τ → ∞.)
This relation ties the CH idea closely to Nash equilibrium in dominance-solvable games: If you believe players will choose equilibrium strategies in (weakly-)dominancesolvable games, then you must also believe the CH model is an equally-good model of behavior in those games, and that τ is very large. The relation between the CH and equilibrium approaches also highlights the essential difference in the two approaches:
Since large values of τ are needed to reach dominance-solvable equilibrium in games that are only solved by deletion of many (iteratively) dominated strategies, if thinking is limited (i.e., τ is not large) then only partial movement toward the dominance-solvable equilibrium will occur.
The CH model makes an interesting prediction about p-beauty contest games that Nash equilibrium does not. In p-beauty contest games with two or more players, with p < 1, the game is dominance-solvable and the unique Nash equilibrium is zero (the number which is equal to p times itself). However, the 2-person game p−beauty contest is special because it can be solved by one step of weak dominance. In the 2-person game, one player will always be high and one low, and p times the average will be closer to the lower player's number. Therefore, rational players want to choose the lowest number possible-0. In the CH model (with any distribution f (k)) all players using one or more thinking steps will choose zero (i.e., the data should consist of approximately 1 − f (0) players choosing exactly zero). This is not true in the 3-player game; a smart player wants to choose a number between the other two numbers if they are sufficiently far apart. In experiments by Grosskopf and Nagel (2001) and new results we report below, there are more choices of 0 in 2-player games than in 3-player games, although not nearly as many as the CH model predicts.
Coordination games
Many interesting games, and models of the macroeconomy, have multiple equilibria (e.g., Cooper, 1999) . This raises an important question of how players, or an entire economy, can coordinate on an equilibrium, and which types of equilibria are most likely to arise. A large game theory literature on "refinements" has struggled with the problem of how to add further mathematical restrictions in order to refine or limit the number of plausible equilibria. The holy grail being sought in this scientific process is a definition that would guarantee existence of a unique refined type of equilibrium. No such definition has been discovered.
The CH model goes in an opposite direction. First note that multiplicity of equilibrium arises because of the mutual consistency assumption. One way to refine predictions about behavior is therefore to weaken mutual consistency, which is what CH does, but achieve precision by specifying decision rules and assumptions about f (k). The CH model therefore can be seen as a behavioral refinement which makes a precise prediction about what will happen in coordination games.
A useful illustration is the "stag hunt" (or "assurance") games. These games are models of economic situations in which there are two equilibria, and one is Pareto-or payoff-dominant (i.e., better for everybody) but seems intuitively riskier than the Paretoinferior equilibrium (e.g., Cooper, 1999; Camerer, 2003, chapter 7) . Table 1 shows a stag hunt game in which each of n players simultaneously choose either L or H. The group choice is H if everyone chooses H, and L otherwise (i.e., if at least one person picks L). The row player earns 1 if everyone chooses H, earns 0 if the she chooses H and the group outcome is L, and earns x (0 < x < 1) if she chooses L (and the group choice is therefore L). Everyone choosing H is a Pareto-dominant equilibrium, but reaching it depends on everyone thinking everyone else will choose H. Choosing L is also an equilibrium, but pays less than if players could somehow coordinate on everyone choosing H.
Game theorists have developed concepts to refine intuitions about when the (L,L) or (H,H) equilibria are likely to arise. The CH model can replicate some of these intuitions and predicts an important effect of group size which has been observed in experimentsnamely, that as the group size n increases, the group is more likely to get drawn into the inefficient (L,L) equilibrium (Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil, 1990; Camerer, 2003, chapter 7).
In the two-player stag hunt game, 1-step thinkers choose H if x < 1/2 and choose L if x > 1/2 because they optimize against 0-step thinkers who randomize. (If x = 1/2 then all players randomize equally.) Higher-step thinkers do exactly what the 1-step thinkers do (for any distribution f (k) with f (0) > 0, not just Poisson). In the three-player game, however, a 1-step player thinks she is facing two 0-step players who randomize independently; so the chance of at least one L is .75. As a result, the 1-step player (and higher-level players) choose H iff x ≤ .25. Thus, for values .25 ≤ x ≤ .5, the CH model predicts mostly H play in 2-player games and mostly L-play in 3-player games (the frequencies of H and L play, respectively, are 1 − (f (0))/2, or 89% for τ = 1.5). This is a simple way of expressing the idea that there is more strategic uncertainty in games with more players, and fits the experimental fact that the inefficient (L,L) outcome occurs more often in larger groups.
There is an interesting connection between the "selection principle" of risk-dominance in 2x2 coordination games (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988 ) and the CH model. Consider the 2-player coordination game in Table 2 .
Assume r 11 > r 21 , r 22 > r 12 and c 11 > c 21 , c 22 > c 12 so there are two pure-strategy equilibria (R,R) and (P,P), which generalizes the stag-hunt game presented above.
14 The (R,R) equilibrium "risk-dominates" (P,P) iff
Now consider what the CH model predicts (for any distribution f (k)). One-step row players (who think they are playing randomizing 0-steppers) will choose R over P iff
Similarly, one-step column players will choose R over P iff Furthermore, if the two inequalities (b) and (c) hold then 2-step players will bestrespond to a mixture of 1-steppers who choose strategy R, and 0-steppers who randomize, so 2-step thinkers will choose strategy R too (as will all higher-step thinkers). Note also that if (b) and (c) holds then (a) holds too-i.e., the (R,R) equilibrium is risk-dominant. Therefore, for games in which both inequalities hold, the CH model predicts the total frequency of R play will be 1 − f (0)/2 (since half the zero-step thinkers choose P), which is 89% for τ = 1.5-i.e., the CH model predicts mostly play of the risk-dominant equilibrium.
A stronger result holds if the game is symmetric (i.e., if r ij = c ij ), in which case the three inequalities (a), (b) and (c) are all equivalent. Then, the CH model coincides with the risk-dominant equilibrium (except for the percentage f (0)/2 of players who choose strategy R). It is important to note that other models can explain why players choose the risk-dominant strategies (and similarly with the entry game below), but our point is that the CH model can explain these patterns along with many others, and fit a wide range of experimental data well.
Market entry games
In section IV below we report experimental results from a simple business entry game. In this game, N entrants simultaneously decide whether to enter a market or stay out (denoted 1 and 0, respectively). Denote the market capacity by c (expressed as a fraction of the number of potential entrants N , so 0 < c < 1). If c or fewer players enter, the entrants all earn a payoff of 1; if more than c enter, the entrants earn zero. Staying out yields a certain payoff of 0.5. For theoretical simplicity, assume there are infinitely many atomistic entrants. (In our empirical estimation we do not make this assumption.) If entrants are atomistic and risk-neutral, they only care about whether the fraction of others entering is above c or not: if the fraction of others entering is below c, they should enter; if it is above, they stay out. Denote the entry function of step k players for capacity c by e(k, c) : c → [0, 1]; this function maps the capacity into a decision to enter (1) or stay out (0). Denote the interim total entry function for all steps up to and including k by E(k, c) :
The function E(k, c) adds up the entry functions of the types up to and including k, and normalizes (by dividing by 14 Appendix A shows that in the Poisson-CH model a particular thinking-step type k has a series of cutpoints which prescribe values of c at which the k− step thinker will enter or not (which, naturally, depend on τ ). For example, a 1-step thinker will stay out for c > .5 and enter for c < .5 (and is indifferent when c = .5); the entry-function therefore has one cutpoint at .5. The Appendix proves that the cumulative entry function E(∞, c) will be weakly monotonic in c-bigger markets attract more entrants-iff 1 + 2τ < e τ , or τ < 1.25.
15 Figure 1 shows the predicted entry functions for CH players using 0, 1, and 2 levels of reasoning (e(0, c), e(1, c), e(2, c),) and the interim cumulative entry function (E(2, c)), for τ = 1.5. Note how the entry function e(2, c) of the 2-step type "smoothes" the cumulative entry function E(2, c). The 2-step thinkers only enter when they think they can exploit the fact that too few lower-0-and 1-step thinkers entered (for .5 1+τ < c < .5 and .5+τ 1+τ < c < 1), and stay out when they think too many 0-and 1-step types entered (for 0 < c < ). Because the CH model is recursive, the game becomes effectively "pseudo-sequential": Higher-level players act as if they are moving "after" they have observed what other players do, even though they are actually playing simultaneously. Now if the game were actually played sequentially, it is easy to see how perfect equilibration could occur: Exactly c of N players would enter because all the later entrants would know how many earlier players had entered. (For example, in a subgame perfect equilibrium the first c entrants would enter and all the subsequent entrants would stay out). Even if the game is actually played simultaneously, the pseudosequentially created by the recursive structure of the CH model therefore approximates the equilibration which would likely occur if the game were actually played sequentially.
A wide variety of experimental data show that in entry games like these, the entry rate is usually remarkably monotonic in capacity c even though players do not communicate and have no way to organize their choices to enter with the correct frequency (e.g., 15 When τ is a little greater than 1.25, as it seems to be empirically in many experimental datasets, there is a small non-monotonicity in which there is more entry at values just below c = .5 than the rate of entry at higher capacities just above c = .5. This is because 1-step thinkers never enter when c < .5 and always enter when c > .5. Their anticipated entry function e(1, c) invites all higher-step thinkers to enter for values just below .5, and to stay out for values just above .5. The cumulative effect of the higher-step thinkers' entry is never overturned as k grows large. The downward-blip in overall entry just below and above c = .5 is probably a small effect empirically but also illustrates a sharp, counterintuitive prediction that could be tested in experiments with a large entry pool N ≈ 100 and values of c bracketed closely around .5, like c = .49 and c = .51.
Rapoport and Seale, in press; Camerer, 2003, chapter 7). Remarking on the surprising similarity between predicted entry rates across values of c and actual entry in pilot experiments he conducted, Kahneman (1988) wrote that "to a psychologist, it looks like magic". The Appendix proof shows how the Poisson-CH model can produce entry which is monotonic in c and approximates equilibrium-the 'magic" which surprised Kahneman. However, players also collectively overenter at low values of c and underenter at high values of c so their behavior is not entirely in equilibrium. The Poisson-CH model also accounts for overentry at low c and underentry at high c, due to the lingering effect of 0-step thinkers who enter half the time regardless of c. The Poisson-CH can therefore explain the magic of approximate equilibration-monotonicity of entry with the capacity c-as well as systematic departures from equilibrium observed in the data.
Estimation and model comparison
This section estimates values of τ in the Poisson CH model and compares its fit to Nash equilibrium. Exploring a wide range of games and models is useful in the early stage of a research program. Models which sound appealing (perhaps because they are conventional) may fit surprisingly badly, thus redirects attention to novel ideas. Fitting a wide range of games turns up clues about where models fail and how to improve them.
Since the cognitive hierarchy model is designed to be general, it is particularly important to check its robustness across different types of games and see how regular the best-fitting values of τ are. Once τ is specified, the model's predictions about the distribution of choices can be easily derived by iterating steps of thinking (and bounding the procedure at a high value of k).
P -beauty contest games
A good warmup example is the p-beauty contest game. Table 3 shows estimates of τ in 24 beauty contest games, which were chosen to minimize the (absolute) difference between the predicted and actual mean of chosen numbers (see our working paper). The table is ordered from top to bottom by the mean number chosen. The first seven lines show games in which the equilibrium is not zero; in all the others the equilibrium is zero.
The first four columns describe the game or subject pool, the source, group size, and total sample size. The fifth and sixth columns show the Nash equilibrium and the difference between the equilibrium and the average choice. The middle three columns show the mean, standard deviation, and mode in the data. The mean choices are generally far off from the equilibrium; they choose numbers which are too low when the equilibrium is high (first six rows) and numbers which are too high when the equilibrium is low (lower rows). The rightmost six columns show the estimate of τ from the CH Poisson model, and the mean, prediction error, standard deviation, and mode predicted by the bestfitting estimate of τ , and the 90% confidence interval for τ estimated from a randomized resampling (bootstrap) procedure.
There are several interesting patterns in Table 3 . The prediction errors of the mean (column 13, "error") are extremely small, less than .6 in all but two cases. This is no surprise since τ is estimated (separately in each row) to minimize this prediction error. The pleasant surprise is that the predicted standard deviations and modes which result from the error-minimizing estimate of τ are also fairly close (across rows, the correlation of the predicted and actual standard deviation is .72) even though τ 's were not chosen to match these moments.
The values of τ have a median and mean across rows of 1.30 and 1.61, close to the golden ratio (1.618...) and √ 2 (≈ 1.41) values derived from simple axioms mentioned above. The confidence intervals have a range of about one in samples of reasonable size (50 subjects or more).
Note that nothing in the CH model, per se, requires τ to be fixed across games or subject pools, or across details of how games are presented or choices are elicited.
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Outlying low and high values of τ are instructive about how widely τ might vary, and why. Estimates of τ are quite low (0-.1) when p > 1 and, consequently, the equilibrium is at the upper end of the range of possible choices (rows 1-2). In these games, subjects seem to have trouble realizing they should choose very large numbers when p > 1 (though they equilibrate rapidly by learning; see Ho, Camerer and Weigelt, 1998) . Low τ 's are also estimated among the PCC subjects playing 2-and 3-player games (rows 8 and 10). High values of τ (≈ 3-5) appear in games where the equilibrium is in the interior, 72, (rows 7-10)-small incremental steps toward the equilibrium in these games produce high values of τ . High τ values are also estimated in games with an equilibrium of zero when subjects are professional stock market portfolio managers (row 19), Caltech students (row 20), game theorists (row 24), and subjects self-selecting to enter newspaper contests (row 25). The latter subject pools show that in highly analytical and educated subject pools (especially with self-selection) τ can be much higher than in other subject pools.
A sensible intuition is that when stakes are higher, subjects will use more steps of reasoning (and may think others will think harder too). Rows 3 and 6 compare low stakes ($1 per person per period) and high stakes ($4) in games with an interior equilibrium of 72. When stakes are higher τ is estimated to be twice as large (5.01 versus 2.51), which is a clue that some sort of cost-benefit analysis may underlie steps of reasoning.
Notwithstanding these interesting outliers, there is also substantial regularity across very diverse subject pools. About half the samples have confidence intervals which include τ = 1. Since CH-type models are ideally suited to capture limited equilibration in dominancesolvable games like the p-beauty contest, it is important to see how well the same model and τ values fit games with different structures. So we fit five other data sets using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) procedure (see Appendix B for a list): Three sets of matrix games with 2-4 strategies (33 games in total); the binary entry game described above with 12 players and capacities c ∈ {2, 4, 6, 8, 10}, and 22 games with mixed equilibria.
The estimation aims to answer two questions: Is the estimated value of τ reasonably regular across games with very different structures? And how accurate is the CH Poisson specification compared to Nash equilibrium? Table 4 shows game-by-game MLE estimates of τ in the Poisson CH model, and estimates when τ is constrained to be common across games within each data set. The interquartile range across the 60 estimates is (.98,2.21) and the median is 1.55. Five of 60 game-specific τ estimates are high (four or more) and a few are zero. Guessing that τ is ∈ [1,2], or is 1.5, should provide reasonably accurate predictions in new games.
How regular is τ ?
The Appendix Table 1 shows bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals for the τ estimates. Most of the intervals have a range of about one. The common τ estimates are roughly 1-2; a τ of around 1.5 is enclosed in the 90% interval in three data sets, and τ seems to be about one in the Cooper-Van Huyck and entry data. This reasonably regular τ suggests that the CH model can be used to reliably predict behaviors in new games. The results also suggest that for predicting a new game, plugging in a value around τ = 1.5 will produce a reasonably good prediction. Table 5 shows log likelihoods (LL) and mean-squared deviations for several model estimated game-by-game or with common parameters across games in a dataset. 17 This table answers several questions. Focusing first on the CH Poisson model, moving from game-specific estimates of τ to common within-column estimates only degrades fit badly in the Stahl-Wilson data; in the other samples imposing a common τ fits about as well as letting τ vary in each game. The CH Poisson model also fits substantially better than Nash. This shows that relaxing mutual consistency can be a fruitful approach to building a descriptive theory of games.
Which models fit best?
A graphical comparison of how much the theories' predictions deviate from the data gives an image of how accurate they are. Each point in Figures 2-3 represents a distinct strategy in each of the 33 matrix games (Figure 2 ) and 22 mixed games (Figure 3) . Each point represents the absolute deviation between the Nash prediction and the data (on the x-axis) and the CH prediction (using a common τ within each dataset) and the data (on the y-axis). Points in the lower right (upper left) of the graph represent strategies in which CH is more (less) accurate than Nash.
The graphs enable us to answer a crucial question visually: When the Nash predictions are good approximations, is CH almost as accurate? The answer appears to be Yes, because there are few points with low Nash deviations and high CH deviations. And when the Nash predictions are poor approximations, are CH predictions usually more accurate? The answer is also Yes. Figure 2 shows that particularly in the matrix games (where Nash often makes 0-1 pure strategy predictions), there are many strategies in which the Nash prediction is off by more than .50, and for almost every strategy the CH prediction is off by less than .20. So CH is able to correct the largest mistakes made by the equilibrium prediction. Figure 3 shows that both models are generally more accurate in mixed games, and that CH improves only a little on equilibrium.
Predicting across games
Good theories should predict behavior in new situations. A simple way to see whether the CH model can do this, within a large sample of games, is to estimate the value of τ on n − 1 datasets and forecast behavior in each holdout dataset separately. (This is a roundabout way to test how stable τ appears to be across games, and whether small variations in estimated τ create large or small differences in predicted choice frequencies.) The result of this cross-game estimation is reported in Table 5 . Across games, the CH model fits only a little less accurately than when estimates are common within games. This suggests the CH model has some promise for predicting behavior in one set of games, based on observations from other games.
Two examples
Two specific games help illustrate concretely how the CH model can explain where Nash predictions succeed and fail. These games were chosen because they have the median likelihood ratio of CH relative to Nash within their respective data sets, so they do not favor either CH or Nash. Table 6 shows game 8 from Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) . The Nash prediction is pure play of (T,L). Most row players do choose T, but a third choose R instead of the equilibrium response L. The CH model (using the common-τ within the Costa-Gomes et al dataset) predicts 82% play of T because it is a dominant strategy and so all players using more than 0 steps are predicted to choose it. CH predicts 45% of players will choose R because half the 0-step players and all the 1-step players choose it (though players using two or more steps pick L). So CH is able to approximate the accurate Nash prediction about dominant strategy play of T, but corrects the Nash misprediction of how often R is played because 1-step thinkers play R. Table 7 shows game 4 from Binmore et al (2001) . This game has a mixed equilibrium in which row players are predicted to choose B, and column players are predicted to choose R, 67% of the time.
The column player prediction is plausible because R pays either 1 or 0, and players actually chose it 83% of the time. The CH model reproduces this finding very closely because all players doing one or more steps of thinking are predicted to choose R, an aggregate frequency of 84%. The Nash prediction that row players choose B most often is less plausible because B has no positive payoffs; and in fact, it is the strategy chosen least often. In equilibrium, of course, players are predicted to choose B because they guess correctly that column players often choose R. In the CH model, however, 1-step thinkers do not anticipate the play of R and mix between T and M. So the CH model predicts 25% choice of each T and M, which is closer to what actually happens than the Nash prediction.
These examples illustrate how the CH model can mix limited thinking with strategic thinking (through the behavior of players doing two or more steps of thinking), and as a result, generally fit data from one-shot games better than equilibrium models do. Remember that these are typical examples; they were not chosen to highlight where CH does best or worst.
Economic value of theories
One way to use theories-perhaps the most common way, in business and governmentis to use their forecasts as a basis for advice about what to do. Camerer and Ho (2001) pointed out that if theories provide advice, the economic value of that advice can sometimes be measured. Economic value is computed by using a theory to predict what other players will do, choosing a best response based on that prediction, and comparing whether the best response would have earned more money than the response a subject actually chose.
Economic value is also a way to measure how well behavior is equilibrated. If players 21 are mutually consistent, then their beliefs already match likely choices so theories will not have economic value. Therefore, one way of testing whether Nash equilibrium is accurate is to see whether it has zero economic value. Similarly, if players are in equilibrium then models which assume they are not in equilibrium (such as the CH model) will have negative economic value. So the economic value of various theories is an indirect way of measuring the degree of equilibration. Furthermore, if the CH model is right then the advice it recommends always coincides with the choices made by the highest-step thinkers. Then the economic value of CH can be interpreted as the marginal payoff to using many steps of thinking. If the economic value-i.e., marginal payoff to thinking harder-is low, this could be used as a justification for an evolutionary or "cognitive economics" explanation of why more players do not think harder, which could potentially endogenize the limits of thinking (cf. Gabaix and Laibson, 2000) . Table 8 reports the economic value of the CH and Nash models. Economic value is computed by figuring out what a theory predicts, for a particular parameter value. These predictions are used to establish what strategy is a best response (i.e., what a person who takes the theory's advice should do). The economic value is the difference between the expected payoff from choosing this best response (averaged across statistical responses) and the average payoff subjects actually earned. The payoffs from predicting perfectly (i.e., using the actual strategies chosen by all other subjects or clairvoyance), are also reported because these represent an upper bound on economic value.
The "In-game Estimates" section of Table 8 shows economic value when common parameters are estimated within each set of games. 18 The CH approach adds value in all data sets, typically 20-50% of the maximum possible economic value. Nash equilibrium adds less value, and actually subtracts value in one data set. The "Out-game Estimates" section shows economic value when parameters are estimated on n − 1 data sets and used to forecast the remaining data set. The economic values are a little lower but the basic pattern is the same. Recall that if players were in equilibrium, the Nash predictions 18 One could argue that economic value measured using within-game τ is upward biased, because the model effectively has access to data about the particular game which the typical subject does not. The cross-game estimation below does not have this upward bias. It is true that the cross-game CH forecast uses other data the subject did not see-namely, the behavior in the other four data sets-but this is typically the case in forecasting (distillation of data is part of what people pay for when they buy forecasts). Furthermore, the subjects have "data" (or insight) which the model doesn't have-namely, how people like themselves and their fellow subjects might react to a particular game, and how they may have behaved in dozens of other experiments they participated in.
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would have zero economic value and disequilibrium models like CH would have negative economic value. The fact that this pattern is not observed is another way of saying players are not in equilibrium (and loosely measuring the 'degree' of disequilibrium).
Economic implications of limited strategic thinking
Models of iterated thinking can be applied to several interesting problems in economics, including asset pricing, speculation, competition neglect in business entry, incentive contracts, and macroeconomics (see our longer paper for some ideas along these lines). An example is Crawford (2003)'s model of optimal lying. He shows that if "some of the people can be fooled some of the time", the presence of these nonstrategic types influences rational players to misrepresent their intentions (much as 0-step players influence the behavior of higher-step thinkers).
We illustrate further with two economic applications that have been studied experimentally: Speculation, and money illusion. The idea is to see whether the CH model can help us understand something fundamental about economics.
Speculation
In 1982, Milgrom and Stokey proved a remarkable "Groucho Marx theorem": If rationality is common knowledge, risk-averse players should not make speculative bets with one another (unless they have hedging motives). Of course, speculation goes on constantly, in the form of sports betting and some fraction of trading in financial markets and other forums. It is difficult to know from field data which assumption of the Groucho Marx Theorem is violated: Is widespread speculation due to hedging (undoubtedly an important part of the operation of foreign exchange and futures markets)? Or to the extra fun from watching a sports event after betting on it? Or is speculation due to limits on knowledge of rationality? Since the CH model does not impose common knowledge of rationality, it contradicts the Groucho Marx theorem and predicts that speculation will occur, even when hedging and spectator fun don't matter. In CH, some degree of betting comes immediately from the fact that 0-step and 1-step players are not thinking strategically about how the betting propensities of others depends on what they know (cf. Eyster and Rabin, 2002). Table 9 illustrates a betting game originally studied experimentally by Sonsino, Erev and Gilat (2000) and replicated by Sovik (2000) . There are four equally-likely states, {A,B,C,D}. After the state is determined, players are privately informed about a set of possible states including the true one. Player I either learns the state is A or B (denoted (A,B) ) or C or D (i.e., (C,D) ). Player II learns the state with certainty if it is A or D, or learns (B,C). Players then choose whether to bet, with payoffs given in Table 9 . If both players bet, they win or lose the amounts in the table column corresponding to the true state.
In equilibrium, there should be no mutual betting if rationality is common knowledge and players think strategically. The proof begins with the fact that rational player II's will never bet in A and always bet in D. If player I is rational and believes player II's are too, she will figure out that she can never win by betting when her information is (A,B) . Iterating further, player II should never bet in (B,C), which leads player I to not bet in information set (C,D). Therefore, players should never mutually bet.
This counterintuitive no-betting result is also the prediction of the CH model with τ → ∞. With τ = 1.5, however, a different picture emerges. One-step player I's will bet when they know (A,B) because they think they are equally likely to win 32 and lose 28. One-step player I's do not realize they are being adversely selected against by player II, who knows the state if it is A. However, two-step thinkers know that one-step player II's won't bet in A, so they will not bet in (A,B) . The result of this iterated limited rationality is high betting rates in the information states (A,B) and (C,D) for player I, and in (B,C) for player II. Table 9 shows predicted betting rates (for τ = 1.5) and Sovik (2000)'s first-round data. 19 The model does not track differences in betting rates across the three ambiguous information states particularly well, but it is an obvious improvement on the Nash prediction of no mutual betting in any states. Furthermore, the model makes testable comparative static predictions: For example, if the payoff in the C state is changed from 20 to 32, betting rates in (B,C) and (C,D) should fall dramatically (from 72% and 89% to 12% and 46%). This example shows how a small change in parameters can turn the predicted CH result from a gross violation of the Groucho Marx Theorem to a reasonable approximation of it. More generally, the example shows how CH captures partial awareness of adverse selection, which may be useful in understanding consumer product markets, the winner's curse in common-value auctions, and so forth.
Money illusion
A long-running debate in macroeconomics concerns the extent of "money illusion", the failure to adjust incomes and prices for inflation. Fehr and Tyran (2002) investigate money illusion in two parallel pricing games. In their games, groups of four players choose integer prices from 1 to 30. In one game, prices are strategic substitutes-players earn more by pricing high when others price low, and vice versa. In the other game, prices are strategic complements-players earn more by matching prices of other players. Each player's nominal payoffs depend on his or her own price and on the (rounded)average price of the other three players in his or her group. These nominal payoffs are displayed in a 30 x 30 table with the player's own prices in 30 rows and the average price of others in the 30 columns. To compute their real payoffs, players had to divide the nominal numbers in the table they see in front of them by the average price of the other players in the group (shown at the top of each column). The research question is whether players would use the nominal payoff, or act as if they calculated real payoffs. If players use real payoffs and are in equilibrium, they will choose prices of 11 and 14 (depending on which of two cost structures, denoted x or y, they have) in both the substitutes and complements conditions. (This is also the prediction of CH with τ → ∞.)
Fehr and Tyran found a striking regularity: In the substitutes condition, players choose prices very close to the Nash predictions of 11 and 14. But in the complements condition, prices were far from equilibrium, a median of 22-23. This pattern leaves unresolved whether players have money illusion or not. It appears that their money illusion depends on the strategic structure of the game, which is an unsatisfying conclusion.
The CH model with the typical value τ = 1.5 can account for this pattern (with one modification 20 ) surprisingly well. The key is that in the complements case, 1-step thinkers have best responses which are prices in the 20's, well above the Nash equilibria, and 2-and higher-step thinkers also choose prices which are too high. Table 10 shows summary statistics of predicted and actual prices and the CH predictions for τ = 1.5 (which is not the best-fitting value). Median experimental prices are predicted exactly in three of four samples. Repeating the main empirical theme of this paper, the model can explain when Nash equilibrium is reached surprisingly quickly (in the substitutes treatment), and can also explain when behavior is far from equilibrium (in the complements treatment). More importantly, the model provides a clear answer to the central research question of whether money illusion occurs. The answer is that players do appear to have money illusion in both treatments, but differences in equilibration in both cases result from a common process of limited strategic thinking. 21 
Conclusion
This paper introduced a simple cognitive hierarchy (CH) model of limited reasoning in games. The model is designed to be as general and precise as Nash equilibrium (in fact, it refines implausible Nash equilibria and always selects one statistical distribution when there are multiple Nash equilibria).
One small innovation in our paper is the use of both axioms and estimation to restrict the frequencies of players who stop thinking at various levels. Most players do some strategic thinking, but the amount of strategic thinking is sharply constrained by working memory. This is consistent with a Poisson distribution of thinking steps that can be characterized by one parameter τ (the mean number of thinking steps, and the variance). Plausible restrictions and estimates from many experimental data sets suggest that the mean amount of thinking τ is between one and two. The value τ = 1.5 is a good omnibus guess which makes the CH theory parameter-free.
assuming that lower level types' choices are correlated occurs in p-beauty contests (see Ho, Camerer and Weigelt, 1998) and weak link games (Camerer 2003 , chapter 7) . The tendency for players to think that a single 0-step player's price distribution is a representative or exemplar of the average price is an example of the "representativeness" heuristic, which is well-documented in research on the psychology of judgment (e.g., Kahneman and Frederick, 2002) . 21 When the CH model is applied to players with no money illusion, it fits the data poorly (since it predicts Nash-like play in the complements case). It also fits poorly if 2-and higher-step players do not have money illusion but lower-step players do.
The more important innovation is showing that the same model can explain limited equilibration in dominance-solvable games (like p-beauty contests) and the surprising accuracy of Nash equilibrium in some one-shot games, such as simultaneous binary entry games in which players choose whether to enter a capacity-constrained market. In one-shot games with no communication, the rate of entry in these games is 'magically' monotonic in the capacity c, but there is reliable over-entry at low values of c and underentry at high values of c. The CH approach predicts monotonicity (it is guaranteed when τ ≤ 1.25) and also explains over-and under-entry. Furthermore, the CH approach creates a kind of endogenous purification that explain how a population mixture of players who use pure strategies (and perhaps regard mixing as nonsensical) can approximate a mixed equilibrium.
Because players do not appear to be mutually consistent in one-shot games where there is no opportunity to learn, it is possible that a theory of how others are likely to play has economic value-i.e, players would earn more if they used the model to recommend choices, compared to how much they actually earn. In fact, economic value is always positive for the CH model, whether τ is estimated within a data set or across data sets. (Economic value is about 1/3 to 1/2 of the maximum possible economic value.) The Nash approach adds less economic value, and sometimes subtract economic value (e.g., in p-beauty contests players are better choosing on their own than picking the Nash recommendation).
There are many challenges in future research. An obvious one is to endogenize the mean number of thinking steps τ , presumably from some kind of cost-benefit analysis in which players weigh the marginal benefits of thinking further against cognitive constraint. The fact that beliefs (and hence, choices) converge as the number of steps rises leads to a natural truncation which limits the amount of thinking.
Since the CH model makes a prediction about the kinds of algorithms that players use in thinking about games, cognitive data other than choices-like prompting players to state beliefs (which might shift 0-step thinkers to one or more steps), response times, or information lookups -can be used to test the model, if it is taken seriously as a procedurally rational model of how thinking occurs.
The model is easily adapted to incomplete information games because the 0-step players make choices that reach every information set. This eliminates the need to impose delicate refinements to make predictions. Explaining behavior in signaling games and other extensive-form games with incomplete information is therefore workable and a high priority for future work. Extending the model to extensive-form games is easy by assuming that 0-step thinkers randomize independently at each information set, and higher-level types choose best responses at information sets using backward induction, but other models can be imagined and could prove more interesting.
Finally, the ultimate goal of the laboratory honing of simple models is to explain behavior in the economy. Models of iterated thinking could prove useful in thinking about asset markets, speculation, contract structure, and other phenomena. 28 
Appendix A: Entry game analysis for Poisson-CH
We have:
In general, E(k, c) is a step function with the following cutpoint values (at which steps begin or end) with increasing c for c < 1/2
The cutpoint values for c > 1/2 are
(For c = 1/2 atomistic entrants are all indifferent and randomize so E(k, .5) = .5 ∀k.)
These cutpoints imply two properties: The cutpoints are always (weakly) monotonically increasing in c for the c < 1/2 segment as long as
For a Poisson f (k), this is equivalent to τ ≤ 2. Furthermore, the last cutpoint for the c < 1/2 segment is greater than the first cutpoint of the c > 1/2 segment iff 1 2
25. Thus, τ ≤ 1.25 implies weak monotonicity throughout both the left (c < 1/2) and right (c > 1/2) segments of the entry function E(k, c) (since τ < 1.25 satisfies the τ < 2 condition and ensures monotonicity across the crossover from the left to right halves of e(k, c)). The entry and mixed-equilibrium games were run in four experimental sessions of 12 subjects each. Each game was played (with no feedback) against a random opponent in the same session and earnings accumulated. Two sessions used undergraduates from Caltech and two used undergraduates from Pasadena City College (PCC), which is near Caltech. (Individual-level estimation in progress suggests the PCC subjects do about .5 steps of thinking fewer than Caltech students.) The mixed-equilibrium games were run on the "playing in the dark" software developed by McKelvey and Palfrey. The entry games and some beauty contest games were run on software Taizan Chan wrote, which is available from us. Note 1: The economic value is the total value (in USD) of all rounds that a "hypothetical" subject will earn using the respective model to predict other's behavior and best responds with the strategy that yields the highest expected payoff in each round. 
